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Abstract
Nike and other companies have long been criticized for outsourcing their produc-
tion to contract factories with dismal working conditions. Despite the overwhelming
amount of interest, there exists no theory for studying this topic. The current pa-
per fills this gap. In the model, the most productive firms in the North make high
profits and outsource their manufacturing production to contract factories in the
South. Factories pay wages that can compensate for poor working conditions, but
these wages might not meet workers’ basic needs. The paper studies an extension
under which factory workers are not appropriately compensated for inferior working
conditions.
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1 Introduction
In 1997, an audit report revealed poor working conditions at one of Nike’s contract
factories. The factory, located in Vietnam, employed around 10,000 workers and produced
400,000 pair of shoes per month. According to the report, factory workers were exposed
to excessive heat, noise, dust, and toxic fumes. Exposure to some carcinogens even
exceeded by 171 times Vietnamese legal standards. An estimate suggested that more than
77% of the workers were suffering from respiratory diseases. Some of the contributing
causes included inadequate ventilation systems, an understaffed medical room, insufficient
protective equipment, and lack of training for workers on occupational health and safety.
In addition, the report found that workers were required to work more hours than the
legal limit and were only paid $10 a week.1
This was neither the first nor the last time that Nike had been accused of outsourc-
ing production to contract factories operating under poor working conditions. But this
report was different. It was not one of the many documents from human rights or labor
groups that had been criticizing Nike’s practices for several years. This was a report
commissioned by Nike itself, and it was prepared by the prominent accounting firm Ernst
& Young. The report was meant to be for Nike’s internal use only, until it leaked to the
media on November 1997, attracting significant press coverage and further damaging the
company’s image (see Greenhouse 1997).
Nike’s business model consists of designing, developing, marketing, and selling the
products, but the actual manufacturing process is outsourced to independent contract
factories located in low-cost countries. In the fiscal year 2012-13, the company employed
1See Ernst & Young (1997). Despite the very serious findings, this report has been criticized for not
being comprehensive enough (see O’Rourke 1997).
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around 48,000 people directly and more than one million people indirectly at 789 contract
factories. Despite the criticisms, the business model has been very successful and has
transformed Nike from a small-scale importer of Japanese shoes to the world’s leader in
athletic footwear, apparel, and equipment. Nike’s gross profits have increased steadily
and surpassed the 12 billion mark in 2014.2
But Nike is by no means the only company that has been accused of benefiting from
exploitative working conditions in developing countries. Other targeted companies in-
clude many brand names such as Reebok, Gap, Mattel, Levi Strauss, Adidas, H&M,
Apple, etc.3 The typical accusations are that workers in the contract factories are forced
to work overtime, under poor working conditions, and for less than the living wage. These
accusations raise several questions. In particular, why do profitable brand companies like
Nike outsource their manufacturing production to contract factories operating under poor
working conditions? Why are working conditions poor in those factories? And why are
factory wages not high enough to meet workers’ basic needs?
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a positive theory of outsourcing and
working conditions that can be used to address these questions. The paper develops an
analytically tractable framework that embeds a compensating-wage-differentials model à
la Rosen (1974, 1987) into the global sourcing model of Antràs and Helpman (2004). The
model consists of two countries, the technologically advanced North and the South. Only
northern firms have the knowledge to design and develop differentiated manufacturing
products. These firms, however, outsource the actual manufacturing stage to contract
factories that can be located either in the North or in the South. Contract factories in
the South can undertake the manufacturing stage at lower costs than contract factories
2See more details in Locke (2003) and Nike (2014a, 2014b).
3See, e.g., Moran (2002); Rosen (2002); Esbenshade (2004); Ross (2004); and Sluiter (2009).
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in the North, but fixed and transportation costs associated with southern outsourcing are
higher. Only the most productive northern firms find it profitable to invest in the higher
fixed costs to benefit from the lower manufacturing costs at southern factories.
Manufacturing production is inherently dangerous. For this reason, good working
conditions are more expensive to provide in factories than in other workplaces in the
economy. In the model, workers’ preferences depend not only on wages, but also (in-
directly) on the working conditions prevailing at their workplace. Thus, to be able to
attract workers, factories have to pay workers a wage premium that compensates them
when working conditions are inferior. Factories, however, only need to pay workers their
outside option plus the compensating wage premium. In the model, the factory workers’
outside option is related to the country’s labor productivity, and this productivity is as-
sumed to be higher in the North. Thus, workers’ outside option is higher in the North,
and this explains why contract factories in the South can undertake the manufacturing
stage at lower costs.
The benchmark model’s main predictions are:
P1: The most productive northern firms make high profits and outsource their actual
manufacturing stage to contract factories in the South.
P2: The level of working conditions at factories depends on the costs of providing these
working conditions and on the country’s labor productivity.
P3: Workers in contract factories earn more than in alternative workplaces, but wages
are only higher because they compensate workers for inferior working conditions.
P4: Despite being higher, factory wages might not meet workers’ basic needs, but the
reason is that the country’s labor productivity is too low.
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P5: The only source of comparative advantage is the difference in labor productivities
between the two countries. Thus, a low-productivity country can attract more
outsourcing contracts since it can undertake the manufacturing stage at lower costs.
The benchmark model can easily be extended to study the consequences of other
frequent accusations that have been made to brand companies. One topic that has
attracted considerable attention is factory workers’ lack of knowledge about occupational
risks and about their labor rights. This is a problem of workers’ misperception about the
true level of working conditions at factories. This extension is important since it shows
that workers’ misperception can lead to poorer working conditions and lower factory
wages. In particular, factory workers might not be appropriately compensated for the
risks they are taking on the job. Also, under workers’ misperception, factories can attract
more outsourcing contracts because they can undertake the manufacturing stage at lower
costs.
A second important extension is noncompliance. Contract factories, especially in low-
cost countries, are often accused of noncompliance with local legal standards. As an
example of noncompliance, this paper studies the consequences when factories do not
comply with wage and safety standards that seek to alleviate the workers’ misperception
problem. The main result is that if compliance inspections are rare and penalties low,
factories can undertake the manufacturing stage at lower costs and are thus able to attract
more outsourcing.
Under workers’ misperception and factories’ noncompliance, the predictions of the
benchmark model need to be replaced by:
P1’: The most productive northern firms make high profits and outsource their actual
manufacturing stage to contract factories in the South. However, workers’ mis-
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perception and factories’ noncompliance in the South lead to even higher
profits and more outsourcing.
P2’: The level of working conditions at factories depends on the costs of providing these
working conditions, on the country’s labor productivity, and on the degree of
workers’ misperception.
P3’: Except for the (unlikely) perfect-misperception case, workers in contract
factories earn more than in alternative workplaces, but wages are only higher be-
cause they compensate workers for inferior working conditions.
P4’: Despite being higher, factory wages might not meet workers’ basic needs. The
reasons are: a low country’s labor productivity and a high degree of workers’
misperception.
P5’: There are three potential sources of comparative advantage: (i) differences in labor
productivity; (ii) differences in the degree of workers’ misperception; (iii)
differences in noncompliance. Thus, a country with a low labor productivity, or
in which workers’ misperception is high, or in which factories’ noncom-
pliance with legal standards is more prevalent can attract more outsourcing
contracts since it can undertake the manufacturing stage at lower costs.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section relates this work to
the existing literature. Section 3 introduces the benchmark model and applies this model
to understand Nike’s international labor practices. Section 4 extends the benchmark
model to account for workers’ misperception and factories’ noncompliance. Section 5
concludes. A detailed Online Appendix contains all derivations reported in the paper.
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2 Related literature
Despite the overwhelming amount of attention that working conditions at Nike contract
factories have attracted from activists, college students, labor unions, NGOs, govern-
ments, international organizations, journalists, and the general public (see, e.g., Spar
2002), there exists to this date no integrated theory that can be used to study the topic.
The current paper fills this gap. In doing so, the paper connects two strands of the
literature.
The first strand is fairly recent and studies the global sourcing strategies of firms
that differ in their productivities.4 Following the seminal contribution of Antràs and
Helpman (2004), this literature seeks to explain the organizational mode and location
choice of firms that are able to fragment their production process into smaller segments.
By incorporating contractual frictions between firms and their subsidiaries or suppliers,
the organizational mode and location choice emerge endogenously as an outcome of these
models. Firms with different productivity levels sort into different organizational forms.
In contrast to Antràs and Helpman (2004), the current paper assumes away contractual
frictions. The consequence of this simplification is that the organizational mode becomes
irrelevant, and firms only have to focus on the location decision. On the other hand,
the current paper extends this literature by incorporating the role of working conditions.
This extension is crucial for studying the issues surrounding the accusations made to Nike
and other brand companies.
The second strand of the literature that this paper connects is a series of applications
of the compensating-wage-differentials theory.5 This theory goes back to Adam Smith’s
4See, e.g., Antràs and Helpman (2004); Grossman and Helpman (2004); Grossman, Helpman, and
Szeidl (2005); and Antràs and Helpman (2008).
5See Rosen (1987) for a summary.
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Wealth of Nations from 1776 but was first formalized by Rosen (1974). The basic idea
is that jobs have nonpecuniary attributes that can be unpleasant for workers. In order
to attract workers, firms have to pay them a premium (or a “compensating wage differ-
ential”) for accepting those unpleasant attributes. The current paper incorporates this
framework into the model to explain why factory workers in low-cost countries tend to
earn more than in alternative employment. The explanation is that their wages are higher
because workers are compensated for the poorer working conditions at factories.
Finally, this paper also contributes to the literature on labor standards and globaliza-
tion.6 One important concern in this literature is over the universality of labor standards.
In particular, should all countries in the world adhere to a set of minimum universal stan-
dards? One argument in favor is that countries with low labor standards can unfairly
attract more investments and that minimum standards are necessary to avoid unfair com-
petition. In contrast to this, some scholars have claimed that prematurely imposing labor
standards might be counterproductive for developing countries. After all, rich countries
introduced most labor standards after having attained a relatively high development level
(see, e.g., Hall and Leeson 2007). The framework presented in this paper proposes a way
to rationalize both views. On the one hand, the benchmark model predicts that the
level of working conditions depends naturally on the development level of a country. On
the other hand, the extended version of the model shows that workers’ misperception
about working conditions and factories’ noncompliance with minimum standards can in-
deed be sources of comparative advantage that might serve the South in attracting more
outsourcing contracts at the expense of the North.7
6This literature is summarized in Brown (2000) and Basu et al. (2003). See also Elliott and Freeman
(2003) and Donado and Wälde (2015).
7Although outside the scope of this paper, a few empirical studies have also investigated the impact
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3 The benchmark model
This section introduces the benchmark model. The model features a world economy
with two countries (the technologically-advanced North and the South), one factor of
production (labor), and two sectors. In sector one, firms in either country produce a
homogeneous good. In sector two, northern firms design, develop, and assemble different
varieties of a manufacturing good. Only the North has the knowledge to undertake
these activities, but northern firms outsource the actual manufacturing stage to contract
factories that can be located either in the North or in the South.
3.1 Individuals
Individuals in the two countries consume the goods produced in both sectors. In par-
ticular, an individual in country i working in occupation j consumes the quantity yij of
the homogeneous good and a continuum of varieties of the differentiated manufacturing
good.8 The index of the manufacturing varieties is given by
X ij =
(∫
∈Ω
xij (ω)
(σ−1)/σ dω
)σ/(σ−1)
, (1)
where Ω represents the endogenous mass of available varieties, and σ > 1 is the constant
elasticity of substitution between any two varieties. The individual preferences are given
of anti-sweatshop activism (Harrison and Scorse 2010) and monitoring for compliance with corporate
codes of conduct (Locke, Qin, and Brause 2007 and Locke et al. 2007) on wages and working conditions
at Nike contract factories.
8As it will be clear along the paper, individuals in the North (i = N) can work in one of five different
types of occupations. They can either provide headquarter services (j = h), manufacturing services
(j = m), fixed costs services (j = f), entry costs services (j = e), or produce the homogeneous good
(j = y). In the South (i = S), individuals can only work in one of two occupations. They can either
provide manufacturing services (j = m) or produce the homogeneous good (j = y).
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by
uij = z
(
sij
) (
X ij
)α (
yij
)1−α
− umin, (2)
where 0 < α < 1. The Cobb-Douglas structure of consumption
(
X ij
)α (
yij
)1−α
in (2) is
standard in the literature, but z
(
sij
)
and umin require more explanation.
First, z
(
sij
)
represents a subutility which is a function of the working conditions
sij ≥ 0 prevailing in the occupation j and country i where the individual works. The
function z
(
sij
)
is assumed to increase in sij but with a diminishing slope, that is, zs > 0
and zss < 0. For concreteness, it is convenient to suppose, as in Donado and Wälde
(2012, 2015), that z
(
sij
)
represents the individual’s health. The implicit assumption
is that poor working conditions deteriorate workers’ health.9 To capture this idea in
the most convenient way, the model restricts z to be bounded between zero and one,
z ∈ [0, 1]. The interpretation is that individuals who are completely healthy (z = 1) enjoy
their consumption
(
X ij
)α (
yij
)1−α
fully, while less healthy individuals (z < 1) enjoy only a
fraction of that consumption. Figure 1 illustrates this health function. An increase in the
level of worker conditions improves the individuals’ health. In the limit, where working
conditions tend to infinity, the health of workers is “perfect.” In this framework, working
conditions sij are characterized in a very general way. Low levels of s
i
j can thus represent
a hazardous working environment, excessive working hours, discrimination, harassment,
abuse, corporal punishment, lack of fringe benefits, etc.
9Empirical support for this assumption can be found in Fletcher, Sindelar, and Yamaguchi (2010);
Cottini and Lucifora (2013); and Barnay (2014).
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Figure 1: Health as a function of working conditions
The second novel element in (2) is umin. This parameter represents a utility threshold
below which individuals are considered to be “suffering.” It is the utility level that indi-
viduals would reach if they were able to exactly meet their basic needs in terms of health
and consumption. It is similar in spirit to the poverty threshold of a multidimensional
poverty index. Following the influential work of Amartya Sen (see, e.g., Sen 1985), the
literature has proposed several such indices.10 The motivation is that poverty should not
be assessed based only on consumption deprivation, but it should also incorporate other
dimensions such as the individual’s health. There are several ways to define a multidi-
mensional poverty threshold. However, the definition that is closest to umin is one that
allows for some substitutability between consumption and health; that is, one in which
for instance a very good health status can partially compensate for a consumption level
below a predefined consumption threshold. Thus, according to (2), an individual will
only have a positive utility (uij > 0) if the mix of actual consumption and health yields
a utility level that is higher than umin. A negative utility level in this context (u
i
j < 0)
10See, e.g., Permanyer (2014) and the references therein.
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means that the individuals are “suffering” because they are not able to satisfy their basic
needs.11
Individuals choose the consumption level that maximizes their utility (2) subject to
their budget constraint. The solution to the problem is given by the demand functions
(see the Online Appendix)
yij = (1− α)
wij
py
and xij (ω) =
pi (ω)−σ
P 1−σ
αwij, (3)
where wij is the individual’s wage, py denotes the price of the homogeneous good, p
i (ω)
is the price of the final good variety whose manufacturing process has been outsourced
to country i, and
P =
(∫
∈Ω
pi (ω)1−σ dω
)1/(1−σ)
(4)
is the price index dual to (1). As it will be clearer below, both countries have the
same price index because the model assumes no transportation costs to export the final
manufacturing variety.
Inserting these demand functions in the utility function (2) gives the indirect utility
function (see the Online Appendix)
uij = z
(
sij
) wij
Λ
Φ− umin, (5)
where
Λ ≡ Pαp1−αy and Φ ≡ α
α (1− α)1−α .
Since Λ denotes the cost-of-living index, the fraction wij/Λ in (5) gives the individual’s
real wage. When we think of individuals as being “consumers,” it is better to represent
11Note that setting umin = 0 does not change the results of this paper in any significant way. The only
point of introducing umin > 0 in (2) is to capture the recurrent idea from the nonacademic literature
that factory workers might not be able to meet their basic needs. Allowing for umin > 0 also simplifies
the presentation and discussion of the model’s main predictions below.
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their preferences with (2), while when we think of them as being “workers,” it is more
convenient to use (5). Both utility functions are closely related. However, the indirect
utility function in (5) shows clearer how wages and worker conditions affect the individ-
ual’s utility. In fact, (5) with umin = 0 is the analogue of the canonical utility function
in compensating wage differential models in which the utility function depends on wages
and working conditions (see, e.g., Rosen 1987).
3.2 Homogeneous good sector
The homogeneous good sector is perfectly competitive. Goods are produced in both
countries using a constant-returns-to-scale technology. Total output in country i is equal
to Y i = aiLiy, where L
i
y is the labor allocated for the production of the homogeneous good,
and ai denotes the labor productivity in this sector. Homogeneous goods are costlessly
traded between the two countries at the international price py. One of the main differences
between the North and the South is that the labor productivity is assumed to be higher
in the North, aN > aS. This is one of the reasons why the North is technologically more
advanced than the South.12 Moreover, due to perfect competition, the price is equal to
the marginal costs of production, py = w
i
y/a
i. This condition, together with aN > aS,
implies that wages in this sector are higher in the North, wNy = a
Npy > w
S
y = a
Spy.
International trade models typically introduce a homogeneous good sector to pin
down wages in a general equilibrium framework. This sector is sometimes called the
“outside” sector, the “agricultural” sector, or the “rest of the economy.” In the current
model, this sector serves as a reference not only for wages but also for productivity and
working conditions in country i. In particular, a country can be made more technologically
12The other reason is that only the North has the knowledge to produce final manufacturing goods
(see below).
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advanced by increasing its labor productivity ai in an exercise of comparative statics.
Also, the current model assumes that working conditions are “perfect” in this sector.
Using the notation from the previous section, “perfect” working conditions mean that
siy −→ ∞, which in turn implies that individuals working in this sector enjoy their
consumption fully since z
(
siy
)
= 1. These working conditions are taken as a point of
reference by individuals working in the other sector. Moreover, since working conditions
are “perfect” in the homogeneous sector, workers do not demand compensating wage
premia to accept a job. The wage
wiy = a
ipy (6)
can therefore be thought of as the “risk-free” wage in country i.
3.3 Manufacturing sector
The manufacturing sector features increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competi-
tion in the production of final goods. Only northern firms have the knowledge to produce
those final goods, but they can outsource the actual manufacturing stage to contract
factories located either in the North or in the South. The structure of this sector is a
complete-contract version of Antràs and Helpman (2004). The timing of events is as
follows:
1. In order to enter the market, northern firms have to pay a sunk entry cost of fe
units of northern labor.
2. These firms then draw their productivity ϕ from a common distribution g (ϕ).
3. Depending on the productivity draw, firms decide whether to immediately exit
the market or to stay and produce the final good. The production of the final
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good takes place in the North and combines two stages, headquarter services h and
manufacturing services m, under a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form
qi
(
hi,mi
)
= ϕ
(
hi
η
)η (
mi
1− η
)1−η
, (7)
where 0 < η < 1 is a measure of headquarter intensity in the production process.
“Headquarter services” are a shortcut for several activities that might include man-
agement, R&D, brand development, marketing, design, accounting, finance opera-
tions, etc. Their production can only take place in the North, and it requires one
unit of northern labor per unit of h. “Manufacturing services” represent the actual
manufacturing process. In some industries, however,m better fits the interpretation
of an intermediate input. Final-good producers can outsource the production of m
to a contract factory located either in the North or in the South. Production of
one unit of m requires one unit of local labor from the supplier country. Note that
the superscript i on h does not mean that h can be produced in the South. This
superscript only identifies the country where the production of the other input, m,
has been outsourced to.13
Given the individual demand function in (3), final-good producers face an aggregate
inverse demand function
pi (ω) =
(
αE
qi (ω)P 1−σ
)1/σ
, (8)
where E denotes total expenditure. Using (7) and (8), the revenue of a firm that
outsources production to country i is given by
ri
(
hi,mi
)
= piqi.
13Since all manufacturing firms are always located in the North, the superscript i on the variables
directly associated with those manufacturing firms (hi, pi, qi, ri, πi, f i) only denotes the country in
which they outsource their manufacturing stage m.
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4. The decision on where to outsource the production of m depends on the costs as-
sociated with each location. On the one hand, southern factories might be able to
produce m at lower costs than northern factories. These costs are denoted by pim
(see below). On the other hand, firms have to pay an additional fixed cost f i in
units of northern labor to produce the final good, and these fixed costs are assumed
to be higher in the case of southern outsourcing, fS > fN . The difference in fixed
costs captures, for instance, differences in communication or search costs between
northern and southern outsourcing. Moreover, if m is produced in the South, firms
have to pay “iceberg” transportation costs τ > 1 to import m back to the North for
final assembly. Thus, when outsourcing in the South, final-good producers compare
the potentially lower variable costs against the higher fixed costs of this strategy.
For simplicity, the current version of the Antràs and Helpman (2004) model assumes
that final-good producers outsource the production ofm to an external supplier and
do not find it profitable to produce m in a wholly owned factory. This assumption
represents a very accurate approximation of the low-skill and labor-intensive indus-
tries (in particular, the apparel and footwear industry) which are the main focus of
the current paper. This also corresponds to the “low headquarter intensity” case
in the original Antràs and Helpman (2004) model.
5. After the location decision has been made, the northern firm and the factory sign
a contract stipulating a quantity mi to be provided by the factory in exchange of a
fee F i. The maximization problem of the northern firm is
max
hi,mi,F i
πi = ri
(
hi,mi
)
− wNy h
i − F i − wNy f
i (9)
subject to
FN − pNmm
N ≥ 0 (10)
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if the factory is located in the North and subject to
F S − τpSmm
S ≥ 0 (11)
if the factory is located in the South, where pim denotes the price of producing one
unit of m in country i. As might be expected, the northern firm will set F i in the
contract to make the factory’s participation constraint (10) or (11) exactly bind.
Two points are worth emphasizing about the maximization problem in (9) - (11).
First, to focus exclusively on the novel aspects related to outsourcing and working
conditions, the model assumes that contracts are complete. Incomplete contracting
has already been studied extensively in the literature (see, e.g., Antràs and Helpman
2004, 2008 and Antràs 2016). Second, the model assumes that firms pay workers
producing hi and those required for f i the northern risk-free wage wNy . In the fol-
lowing section, it will become clearer how this contrasts to the wages paid to factory
workers. For the time being, it suffices to emphasize that the implicit assumption
in (9) is that workers producing hi and f i enjoy “perfect” working conditions, and
northern firms do not need to pay them any compensating wage premium to attract
those workers.
Now, plugging the first-order conditions that result from the maximization prob-
lem in the profit function in (9) allows us to express the profit flow of the firms
outsourcing in the North as
πN (ϕ) = ϕσ−1B
((
wNy
)η (
pNm
)1−η)1−σ
− wNy f
N (12)
and of the firms outsourcing in the South as
πS (ϕ) = ϕσ−1B
((
wNy
)η (
τpSm
)1−η)1−σ
− wNy f
S, (13)
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where
B ≡
1
σ
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ−1
αE
P 1−σ
(14)
measures the demand level (see the Online Appendix for details).
6. After the inputs h and m have been produced, northern firms assemble the final
good q and then sell it to consumers in both countries. As in the original model
from Antràs and Helpman (2004), the current model assumes for simplicity that
there are no costs associated with exporting the final good q to the South.14
3.4 Contract factories
As already mentioned, northern firms subcontract factories to undertake the actual man-
ufacturing process, m. Factories, for their part, produce m under perfect competition
and with a technology that features constant returns to scale. In the model, good work-
ing conditions are more expensive to provide in factories than in other workplaces in
the economy. Building on the Nike example from the introduction, a safe shoe factory
requires ventilation systems, protective equipment for workers, training on occupational
health and safety, a medical room, etc. Some of these measures have a public good char-
acter because they benefit all factory workers equally. For simplicity, however, the model
assumes that the costs of these measures increase linearly with the number of workers.
Since factories producem under constant returns to scale (i.e.,m can be produced one-
to-one with labor), the maximization problem can be solved for each worker separately.
14See also Antràs (2016, ch. 4) and Antràs and Yeaple (2014, sect. 5.3). This assumption is typically
made to abstract from the horizontal (FDI) dimension in which firms might replicate the same production
process in another country to save on transportation costs or tariffs.
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The profits per worker of a factory located in country i are given by
πim = p
i
m − w
i
m − γs
i
m, (15)
where wim and s
i
m respectively denote the wage and the level of working conditions, and
γ represents the cost per worker of a unit of working conditions. To attract workers,
factories have to make them indifferent between working in a factory and in a “risk-free”
workplace. Thus, using the indirect utility function in (5), the workers’ participation
constraint is given by
z
(
sim
) wim
Λ
Φ− umin =
wiy
Λ
Φ− umin
⇐⇒ z
(
sim
)
wim = w
i
y. (16)
Factories choose wim and s
i
m to maximize (15) subject to (16). A very convenient
functional form for the health function z (sim) that allows to obtain closed-form solutions
is
z
(
sim
)
=
sim
1 + sim
. (17)
Under the assumption of (17), the first-order conditions resulting from the factory’s max-
imization problem are (see the Online Appendix)
sim =
(
wiy
γ
)1/2
(18)
and
wim =
(
wiyγ
)1/2
+ wiy. (19)
Equations (18) and (19) are very intuitive. First, the level of working conditions in (18)
is increasing in the workers’ outside option wiy and decreasing in the cost of working
conditions γ. It is clear from (18) that working conditions in the factories are less than
“perfect” (since sim < ∞). Second, factory wages in (19) represent a premium
(
wiyγ
)1/2
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over the country’s risk-free wage wiy. The premium
(
wiyγ
)1/2
is what the literature calls
the “compensating wage differential,” and it is a premium that workers receive for the
poorer working conditions in the factories. Note that this premium increases in γ. The
reason is that factories provide a lower level of working conditions in (18) when γ is high.
To compensate for this lower level, factories have to increase the wage premium in (19)
to be able to attract workers.
Perfect competition among factories drives profits down to zero, and the manufactur-
ing production price can be determined from (15) with πim = 0, which after inserting (18)
and (19) and rearranging is given by
pim = 2
(
wiyγ
)1/2
+ wiy. (20)
This manufacturing production price is a very important variable in the model. Together
with the fixed costs f i and the transportation costs τ , it is the price that the northern
firms take into consideration when choosing the location for the manufacturing stage. In
the model, southern factories can produce m at a lower price
(
pSm < p
N
m
)
since the risk-
free wages are lower in the South
(
wSy < w
N
y
)
. Looking at how these risk-free wages are
determined in (6) makes it clear that the ultimate source of the North-South difference
in manufacturing production prices is the difference in labor productivities
(
aS < aN
)
.
Interestingly, not only pim but also s
i
m and w
i
m depend indirectly on a
i, and all three
variables increase with this labor productivity. In other words, the development level of a
country (as measured by ai) determines the level of wages and working conditions in the
factories and the manufacturing production price. Thus, in more developed countries,
factories pay higher wages and provide better working conditions, but the prices they
demand for undertaking the manufacturing stage are also higher.
It is worth emphasizing that if the cost of working conditions was equal to zero (γ = 0),
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working conditions in the factories would be perfect (sim →∞), and factory wages and
manufacturing production prices would converge to the risk-free wage
(
wim = p
i
m = w
i
y
)
.
Perfect working conditions and risk-free wages are the standard assumptions in outsourc-
ing models. In fact, a perfect-contract version of Antràs and Helpman (2004)15 is a special
case of the current model when γ = 0 and umin = 0.
To close this section, note that wages and working conditions in the two sectors can
be represented in a standard compensating-wage-differentials diagram,16 such as the one
in Figure 2. The worker’s indifference curve vi comes from (16) using (17),
sim
1 + sim
wim = w
i
y ⇐⇒ w
i
m = w
i
y +
wiy
sim
, (21)
while the factory’s zero-profit isoprofit line πim0 can be obtained using (15),
pim − w
i
m − γs
i
m = 0 ⇐⇒ w
i
m = p
i
m − γs
i
m.
It is clear from (21) that the factory wage wim converges to the risk-free wage w
i
y as factory
working conditions sim tend to infinity. In Figure 2, this means that the indifference
curve vi converges to the dashed line without ever reaching it. For illustrative purposes,
however, Figure 2 pretends that there exists a point at which the indifference curve
touches the dashed line, and at this point, working conditions are perfect (“sy =∞”).
This allows us to represent point A1, which gives the package of wages and working
conditions in the homogeneous sector. Moreover, point A2 represents the package of
wages and working conditions at factories. Since the indifference curve passes through
A1 and A2, workers are indifferent between working in the homogeneous sector (for perfect
working conditions and risk-free wages) and in a factory (for poor working conditions but
relatively high wages).
15See also Antràs 2016, ch. 4.
16See, e.g., Ehrenberg and Smith 2014, ch. 8.
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Figure 2: Wages and working conditions
3.5 Equilibrium
Now that we understand how the manufacturing production prices pim are determined in
the economy, we can turn to the characterization of the equilibrium. Remember that the
profit flows of northern manufacturing firms for each outsourcing location are given by
(12) and (13). Figure 3 plots these profits as a function of ϕσ−1 under the assumption
that pNm > τp
S
m. As the figure illustrates, northern firms with productivity levels below
ϕN would make negative profits if they produced. Thus, these firms exit the market
immediately after learning their productivity. From the firms that remain active, those
with productivity levels between ϕN and ϕS will outsource their manufacturing stage
to northern factories, while those with productivity levels above ϕS will find it more
profitable to outsource their manufacturing stage to southern factories.
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Figure 3: Profit flows and firm productivity
As is evident from the figure, ϕN can be computed from (12) with πN
(
ϕN
)
= 0,
and ϕS can be computed using (12) and (13) for πN
(
ϕS
)
= πS
(
ϕS
)
. The resulting
productivity cutoffs are
ϕN =
(
wNy f
N
B
) 1
σ−1 (
wNy
)η (
pNm
)1−η
(22)
and
ϕS =


(
wNy
)1−η(1−σ) (
fS − fN
)
B
(
(τpSm)
(1−η)(1−σ)
− (pNm)
(1−η)(1−σ)
)


1
σ−1
. (23)
In the model, the only reason why manufacturing firms pay the sunk entry cost is
because they expect their profits to be positive after entering the market. In equilibrium,
the expected operating profits of a potential entrant have to be equal to the total entry
costs. The total entry costs are the amount of northern labor employed in the entry
stage (fe) multiplied by the northern risk-free wage paid to that labor w
N
y . The free
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entry condition is
∫ ϕS
ϕN
πN (ϕ) g (ϕ) dϕ+
∫
∞
ϕS
πS (ϕ) g (ϕ) dϕ = wNy fe. (24)
Equations (22), (23), and (24) form a system of three equations in three unknowns. These
equations provide solutions for the cutoffs ϕN and ϕS and for the demand level B. Having
obtained ϕN , ϕS, and B, we can then determine all other variables in the model (see the
Online Appendix for more details).
3.6 Model predictions
After having laid out the model, this section enumerates its main predictions and applies
the framework to understand the debate surrounding Nike and its international labor
practices. In particular, this section seeks to understand: why do profitable brand com-
panies like Nike outsource their manufacturing production to contract factories operating
under poor working conditions? Why are working conditions poor in those factories?
And why are factory wages not high enough to meet workers’ basic needs? In short:
“why do they JUST DO IT?” The model’s first prediction is:
P1: The most productive northern firms make high profits and outsource their actual
manufacturing stage to contract factories in the South.
It is not unusual for a brand company like Nike to make high profits. Since its founda-
tion in 1964, Nike has constantly reported positive gross profits. The model’s explanation
is very simple: Nike makes high profits because it is a very productive company. As il-
lustrated in Figure 3, the model predicts a positive linear relationship between profits
and the productivity measure ϕσ−1. In the model, the most productive firms make the
highest profits.
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But why does Nike outsource its manufacturing production to foreign countries? Dur-
ing its initial years, Nike shoes were produced in the U.S. and Japan. Over time, however,
the company started to look for lower cost alternatives. With the constant reduction
in transportation costs, Nike outsourced more an more production to contract factories
located in South Korea and Taiwan. However, as these countries developed and their pro-
duction costs increased, Nike relocated production to independent factories in Indonesia,
Vietnam, and China (Locke 2003).
As with profits, the model predicts that Nike outsources its manufacturing production
in the South because it is a very productive company. In the model, only the most
productive firms find it profitable to invest in the fixed costs associated with southern
outsourcing (fS) to benefit from the lower production costs at southern factories. As
it is clear from the profit flows in (12) and (13), differences in fixed costs (fN vs. fS)
and in the effective prices (pNm vs. τp
S
m) are the key location determinants. A decline
in southern fixed costs fS, in transportation costs τ , or in the southern manufacturing
production prices pSm increases the prevalence of southern outsourcing. Moreover, if τp
S
m
is very low relative to pNm, the model predicts an equilibrium in which all firms in the
sector will outsource their manufacturing stage in the South. In contrast, if τpSm is very
high compared to pNm, then the resulting equilibrium is one in which all firms outsource
the manufacturing stage in the North. These two extreme equilibria are illustrated in
Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Extreme equilibria
P2: The level of working conditions at factories depends on the costs of providing these
working conditions and on the country’s labor productivity.
Working conditions at Nike contract factories have often been criticized for being very
poor. As shown in equation (18), the benchmark model provides two explanations for
poor working conditions. The first one is that the production process taking place at
those factories is inherently dangerous and providing good working conditions requires
investment in costly safety measures. For instance, the manufacturing process of a Nike
pair of shoes involves several health and safety risks for workers.17 Adhesives for gluing
together the different shoe components might not only be highly flammable, but they
can also contain toxic solvents (such as benzene, toluene, or xylene) that can cause ver-
tigo, headaches, nausea, loss of consciousness, or even cancer and reproductive disorders.
Machines can injure workers directly or produce excessive vibrations, noise, heat, or dust
that can affect workers health. Appropriate ventilation systems, protective equipment,
training on occupational health and safety, and regular medical examination can reduce
the harmful effects of production, but these preventive measures are costly to provide.
17See Chen and Chan (1999); Markkanen (2009: 23-28); and Conradi and Portich (2011).
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Without any investments in these measures, shoe production can be very dangerous for
workers.
The second explanation from the model for poor factory working conditions is related
to the country’s labor productivity (ai).18 In the model, the labor productivity is a
measure of the country’s development level. The model thus predicts that the quality
of working conditions improves with the development level of a country. Compared to
rich countries, factory working conditions in the Third World can appear dreadful. But
factory working conditions have not always been good in the developed world either. For
instance, during the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain, factory workers labored for
as many as sixteen hours a day, six days per week. They performed activities that were
monotonous, dangerous, and unhealthy. Factories were not only noisy, but they were
also poorly lit and lacked appropriate ventilation (Powell 2014: 112-120). Some of these
working conditions resemble those of developing countries today. Thus, according to the
model, working conditions in southern factories will improve naturally as the country
develops.
P3: Workers in contract factories earn more than in alternative workplaces, but wages
are only higher because they compensate workers for inferior working conditions.
Are wages at Nike contract factories too low? In the example from the introduction,
workers at the Vietnamese factory were only paid $10 a week. Compared to the U.S.
minimum wage of $5.15 an hour (also for the year 1997), Vietnamese factory wages
look indeed very low. An American factory worker would have earned more after two
hours of work than a Vietnamese factory worker after 48 hours. But this is not the
relevant comparison. For a Vietnamese worker, what counts are the job alternatives in
18This can be seen after plugging (6) in (18).
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Vietnam, not in the U.S., and the relevant question is “how do Vietnamese factory wages
compare to the workers’ next best alternative in their own country?” The number of
studies addressing this type of question is still very limited, but they suggest that factory
workers in low-cost countries tend to earn more than the local national average. For
instance, Powell and Skarbek (2006) and Powell (2014: 48-62) find that apparel workers’
average income exceeds the average income in Vietnam and in other countries to which
brand companies typically outsource their manufacturing production.19
The model is able to capture the two main features from this discussion: First, that
factory wages are higher in the North than in the South; and second, that wages at
factories are higher than in other workplaces in the economy. The first result can be
clearly seen by plugging equation (6) into (19). The simple prediction from the model
is that wages are higher at northern factories because the North is technologically more
advanced than the South (aN > aS). The explanation for the second result is that
factory wages are higher than in alternative employment in the same country because
they compensate for the poorer working conditions.
In reality, working conditions at factories do not necessarily have to be worse than in
alternative workplaces. If workers’ alternatives are scavenging in a trash dump or prosti-
tution, then working conditions at shoe factories are comparably better. For simplicity,
however, the model assumes that the homogenous sector is characterized by “perfect”
working conditions. Thus, relative to that point of comparison, factories have to offer
wage premia to be able to attract workers. However, the real testable prediction from
the benchmark model is not necessarily that factory wages are higher, but that they
19Other studies have found that foreign owned businesses tend to pay higher wages (see Brown, Dear-
dorff, and Stern 2004 for a literature overview). However, in the industries that are the focus of the
current paper, factories are typically not owned by the subcontracting companies.
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are only higher if working conditions at factories are relatively worse than in alternative
employment.
P4: Despite being higher, factory wages might not meet workers’ basic needs, but the
reason is that the country’s labor productivity is too low.
Why do factory wages might not be high enough to meet workers’ basic needs? Ac-
cording to the model, Nike contract factories only need to offer workers a package of
wages and working conditions that makes them indifferent between factory employment
and alternative employment (see equation (16) and Figure 2). If the package of wages
and working conditions in alternative employment is bad in the first place, then Nike
factories can attract workers by also offering a bad package. The composition of that
package is different at factories because of the inferior working conditions, but workers’
utility from both alternatives is equally low. In other words, what workers can get at
Nike factories is only as good (or as bad) as their available alternatives.
But why are these alternatives bad? In the model, factory workers’ alternatives are
jobs in the homogeneous sector. Wages in the homogeneous sector in (6) are determined
by the country’s labor productivity. If this productivity is low, wages might not be high
enough to meet workers’ basic needs umin in the indirect utility function (5). Thus, in
the benchmark model, the only reason for why workers might not be able to meet their
basic needs is that the country’s labor productivity is too low.
P5: The only source of comparative advantage is the difference in labor productivities
between the two countries. Thus, a low-productivity country can attract more
outsourcing contracts since it can undertake the manufacturing stage at lower costs.
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Over time, Nike has changed the location of its manufacturing production. This
relocation has taken place because Nike has searched for the cheapest countries to manu-
facture its goods. In the model, the cheapest country is the one that can offer the lowest
manufacturing production prices pim. As explained below equation (20), the only reason
why these prices differ across countries is because countries differ in their labor productiv-
ities ai. Factories in a low-productivity country can undertake the manufacturing stage
at lower prices. Thus, low-productivity countries are able to attract more manufacturing
contracts.
4 Extensions
The benchmark model, although stylized in some dimensions, is tractable enough to
accommodate several extensions. This section studies two extensions that have been
at the heart of the Nike debate. The first one is workers’ misperception about their
working conditions, and the second one is factories’ noncompliance with minimum labor
standards.
4.1 Workers’ misperception
One finding of Nike’s audit report from the introduction was that workers at the Viet-
namese factory were not fully aware of the harmful effects of the chemicals they had
to deal with. This was not an isolated case. According to another report on Nike and
Reebok contract factories in China,20
“[m]any workers did not consider the chemicals in their factories to be haz-
ardous, but this is often a reflection of their lack of understanding about health
20AMRC and HKCIC (1997). See also Chen and Chan (1999).
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and safety issues. One chemical, benzene, which is used in China as a glue in
making sports shoes, can cause anemia and leukemia and is so toxic that it
has been banned in the United States and many European countries. But the
factories do not inform the workers of the contents of poisonous substances,
so workers have no way of knowing the degree of harm done to their bodies.”
Lack of sufficient knowledge on occupational risks is a common problem. Another
problem is that factory workers are not aware of their legal rights either. For instance,
the same report claimed that
“workers often had a difficult time answering questions about overtime be-
cause it is hard for them to distinguish between a ‘normal work day’ and
overtime. When hired, the workers were told they had to work 12 hours a
day. According to the Chinese Labour Law, the work day should only be eight
hours long, and the four extra hours of work should be counted as overtime.
However, the factories set the ‘normal’ work day as 12 hours, and then add
additional overtime work. Therefore, if a worker works a 15-hour day, she will
usually say she worked three hours of overtime, when she really worked seven
overtime hours.”
Lack of knowledge on occupational risks and on labor rights are both examples of
workers’ misperception about the true level of working conditions. As this section will
show, workers’ misperception has consequences for wages, working conditions, and the
manufacturing production price.
The current paper models workers’ misperception in the simplest possible way. It
builds on the approach introduced by Diamond (1977) and Viscusi (1980). Specifically,
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factories still choose wim and s
i
m to maximize the same profit function in (15), but the
workers’ participation constraint is now given by
z
(
µisim
) wim
Λ
Φ− umin =
wiy
Λ
Φ− umin
⇐⇒ z
(
µisim
)
wim = w
i
y, (25)
where µi ≥ 1. Except for the parameter µi, this participation constraint is identical to the
one from the benchmark model in (16). The parameter µi is called the “misperception”
parameter. Note that µi is present in (25) but not in the factory’s profit function in (15).
This is how the model captures the idea that factory owners are assumed to know the
exact level of working conditions, while workers perceive these working conditions to be
better than they actually are.21 For instance, µi = 2 would mean that workers perceive
their working conditions to be twice as good as they actually are.
The factory’s problem consists in maximizing its profits in (15) subject to the new
workers’ participation constraint in (25). To obtain closed-form solutions, it is again
convenient to assume the following functional form for the health function (see eq. (17))
z
(
µisim
)
=
µisim
1 + µisim
.
Under this assumption, the first order-conditions are given by
s̃im =
(
wiy
γµi
)1/2
(26)
21In reality, factory owners might not have perfect knowledge on some working conditions either. For
example, some occupational diseases might take several years to manifest, and even employers might
not be aware of the causal link between a particular disease and factory production. However, what
is important for the argument is that factory owners have more knowledge than workers. To simplify
the model, the paper assumes that factory owners perceive working conditions as they truly are, while
workers underperceive them.
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and
w̃im =
(
wiyγ
µi
)1/2
+ wiy, (27)
where the tilde ( ˜ ) is used to denote the variables for the workers’ misperception case.
Compared to the benchmark model, the first-order conditions in (26) and (27) now
feature the misperception parameter µi. Importantly, an increase in misperception leads
to poorer working conditions in (26) and to lower wages in (27). These results echo those
of Diamond (1977) and Viscusi (1980) who find that workers’ wages are lower and job
risks are higher under workers’ misperception. In the current model, wages are lower
because the compensating premium
(
wiyγ/µ
i
)1/2
decreases in µi. The implication is that
workers are not appropriately compensated for the poorer working conditions at factories.
Following the same steps as in the benchmark model, the manufacturing production
price can be derived as
p̃im = 2
(
wiyγ
µi
)1/2
+ wiy. (28)
As with the first-order conditions, this price also decreases in the misperception parame-
ter. Thus, under workers’ misperception, factories are able to attract more outsourcing
contracts because they can undertake the manufacturing stage at lower costs.
Figure 5 illustrates wages and working conditions in a compensating-wage-differentials
diagram.22 For workers, the main consequence of their misperception is that, instead of
receiving the “perfect-perception” package (wim, s
i
m) represented by point A2, they now
22In the current model, “perfect” working conditions correspond to the case in which sij −→∞. This
level of working conditions cannot be represented in a standard compensating-wage-differentials diagram.
For illustration purposes, however, Figures 2 and 5 pretend that such a point exists on the horizontal
axis. This point is labeled as “siy =∞”. In reality, in Figure 5, the two indifference curves v
i and ṽi will
never meet at point A1. Both indifference curves will converge to the dashed line (without ever touching
it), but ṽi will always be closer to that line than vi.
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obtain the inferior package (w̃im, s̃
i
m) represented by A3. Workers clearly see their wage
w̃im, but they misperceive their actual level of working conditions. In particular, they
believe that their working conditions are equal to sim2, instead of equal to s̃
i
m. In other
words, workers believe that they are at point A4, while they are in fact at point A3. If
workers were informed about their actual working conditions, they would immediately
experience the lower utility level ṽi.
Figure 5: Consequences of workers’ misperception
4.2 Noncompliance
Nike’s audit report from the introduction identified several violations of local laws at the
Vietnamese contract factory (see Table 1). In some sections of the factory, workers’ expo-
sure to heat, noise, dust, and to the toxic solvents toluene and acetone clearly exceeded
legal standards. The most alarming transgression was workers’ exposure to toluene, which
was found to be 171 times higher than the maximum permitted. Moreover, a follow-up
report (see O’Rourke 1997) claimed violations of maximum overtime hours that sub-
stantially surpassed the limit of 200 hours per year. These accusations parallel those
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of the Nike and Reebok report on contract factories in China that denounced factories’
noncompliance with Chinese labor laws on minimum wages, maximum overtime hours,
treatment of workers, safety standards, medical insurance, bereavement leave, maternity
leave, etc.23 Connor (2002) makes similar claims of Nike and Adidas contract factories
in Indonesia.
Table 1: Noncompliance at the Vietnamese factory
This section adapts the approach by Ashenfelter and Smith (1979) to study the con-
sequences on working conditions and outsourcing of factories’ noncompliance with legal
standards. As an example of noncompliance, the section focuses on the consequences
when factories do not comply with wage and safety standards that intend to solve the
workers’ misperception problem. The previous section made clear that workers’ misper-
ception can lead to lower wages, poorer working conditions, and lower utility for workers.
A perfectly informed government could increase workers’ utility by mandating minimum
wage and labor standards that match those of the perfect-perception case.
More precisely, suppose that the government of country i mandated the perfect-
perception standards (see equations (18) and (19))
sim =
(
wiy
γ
)1/2
, wim =
(
wiyγ
)1/2
+ wiy.
23AMRC and HKCIC (1997). See also Chen and Chan (1999).
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However, since workers are uninformed about their true working conditions, factories can
still attract workers by offering them the inferior package (see equations (26) and (27))
s̃im =
(
wiy
γµi
)1/2
, w̃im =
(
wiyγ
µi
)1/2
+ wiy. (29)
For factories, the decision to comply or not to comply with the government standards
depends on the resulting ex-ante profits from each strategy. In particular, complying
factories expect to generate the ex-ante profit (see eq. (15))
πim = p
i
m − w
i
m − γs
i
m, (30)
while noncomplying factories expect
π̃im = p̃
i
m − w̃
i
m − γs̃
i
m − ρ
iDi, (31)
where ρi denotes the probability of being caught, and Di is the per-worker penalty. Fac-
tories will not comply if π̃im > π
i
m. It turns out that the prevalence of noncompliance
increases with the misperception parameter µi and decreases with ρi or Di. The conse-
quences for working conditions and wages are clear. If µi is high or if ρi or Di are low,
factories are more likely to offer workers the inferior package in (29).
Also note that, as in the benchmark model, perfect competition drives factories’ ex-
post profits to zero. The compliance and noncompliance manufacturing production prices
can therefore be obtained from (30) and (31) with πim = 0 and π̃
i
m = 0, respectively. The
resulting compliance price is identical to the one of the benchmark model in (20). In
contrast, the noncompliance price is now given by
p̃im = 2
(
wiyγ
µi
)1/2
+ wiy + ρ
iDi.
This price increases in ρi and Di. As a consequence, factories in a country in which
compliance inspections are rare or in which penalties are low can undertake the man-
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ufacturing stage at lower prices and will therefore be able to attract more outsourcing
contracts.
4.3 Predictions of the extended model
This section explains how the 5 predictions of the benchmark model are affected by
workers’ misperception and by factories’ noncompliance. The first new prediction is:
P1’: The most productive northern firms make high profits and outsource their actual
manufacturing stage to contract factories in the South. However, workers’ mis-
perception and factories’ noncompliance in the South lead to even higher
profits and more outsourcing.
To best understand this prediction, consider the following exercise of comparative
statics: Starting from a situation in which workers in both countries are perfectly informed
(µN = µS = 1), increase the southern misperception parameter (µS ↗), while keeping
the northern misperception parameter at the perfect-perception level (µN = 1). In other
words, introduce workers’ misperception in the South, but maintain perfect perception
in the North. What are the consequences of this exercise on profits and outsourcing?
The first impact is a decline in the manufacturing production price in the South pSm
(see eq. (28)). In Figure 3, this price reduction would increase the slope of the profit
function associated with southern outsourcing πS, moving the cutoff point
(
ϕS
)σ−1
to the
left. The consequences are twofold: First, more northern firms would find it profitable
to outsource their manufacturing stage in the South. Second, those northern firms that
were already engaged in southern outsourcing would be able to generate even higher
profits. The consequences of a reduction of pSm via a decrease in the southern probability
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of being caught ρS or in the southern noncompliance penalty DS are identical. Thus,
in the extended model, northern manufacturing firms benefit from a misinformed labor
force and from low levels of compliance. Policies that reduce the degree of workers’
misperception or that increase factories’ compliance in the South would lead to higher
utility for southern workers (see Figure 5) but to lower profits for northern manufacturing
firms.
P2’: The level of working conditions at factories depends on the costs of providing these
working conditions, on the country’s labor productivity, and on the degree of
workers’ misperception.
Under workers’ misperception, working conditions at the factory are worse than under
perfect perception. Factories are able to provide this lower level of working conditions
only because workers do not notice the difference.
P3’: Except for the (unlikely) perfect-misperception case, workers in contract
factories earn more than in alternative workplaces, but wages are only higher be-
cause they compensate workers for inferior working conditions.
In the extended model, the wage premium paid to factory workers for accepting inferior
working conditions decreases with the misperception parameter µi (see eq. (27)). The
reason is that if workers are misinformed about their working conditions, they are willing
to take factory jobs without demanding an appropriate compensation for the poorer
working conditions. In general, even under misperception, factory workers will earn more
than in alternative workplaces. The factory premium might be lower when workers are
misinformed, but there will still be a premium. There is, however, one exception to this
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rule: “perfect misperception.” When workers are perfectly misinformed (that is, when
µi −→∞), factory wages in (27) converge to the risk-free wage wiy. Only in that extreme
(and unlikely) case, the factory premium disappears completely, and factory workers are
paid the same wage as other workers in the economy.
P4’: Despite being higher, factory wages might not meet workers’ basic needs. The
reasons are: a low country’s labor productivity and a high degree of workers’
misperception.
Workers’ misperception can also explain why workers might not be able to meet their
basic needs. The mechanism is very simple. As it is clear from the misperception first-
order conditions in (26) and (27), wages and the level of working conditions decrease
in the misperception parameter µi. Plugging these first-order conditions in the indirect
utility function in (5) implies that workers’ utility also decreases in µi. Consequently, if
µi is high enough, workers might not be able to satisfy their basic needs umin. Moreover,
in the extreme case of perfect misperception (µi −→∞), the indirect utility converges to
−umin, the lowest possible utility level in the model.
P5’: There are three potential sources of comparative advantage: (i) differences in labor
productivity; (ii) differences in the degree of workers’ misperception; (iii)
differences in noncompliance. Thus, a country with a low labor productivity, or
in which workers’ misperception is high, or in which factories’ noncom-
pliance with legal standards is more prevalent can attract more outsourcing
contracts since it can undertake the manufacturing stage at lower costs.
As it is clear from this prediction, the extended model is able to rationalize the idea
that poor working conditions can be a source of comparative advantage. If workers’
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knowledge on labor rights and on occupational risks is insufficient, or if compliance in-
spections are rare and penalties are low in a developing country, then that country will
probably be able to manufacture products at lower costs than other countries. First
World companies will find it profitable to source their products from that country.
5 Conclusion
For several years, Nike and other brand companies have been the target of widespread
criticism for outsourcing their manufacturing production to contract factories with dismal
working conditions. The main allegations are that factory workers are paid extremely
low wages, are required to work excessive overtime, and are often exposed to unsafe,
unhealthy, and abusive working conditions. According to critics, these working conditions
stand in stark contrast to the large profits usually reported by brand companies. The
current paper has introduced a theory of outsourcing and working conditions that is able
to rationalize these observations.
In the framework, the most productive northern firms make large profits and out-
source their manufacturing production to independent contract factories located in the
South. Compared to the North, wages and the level of working conditions in southern
factories can be relatively low. Southern workers, despite earning more at factories than
in alternative employment, might not be able to meet their basic needs. The bench-
mark model predicts that only an improvement in the southern labor productivity can
lift workers out of poverty.
The model, although stylized in some dimensions, is tractable enough to accommodate
several extensions. The current paper has shown how to incorporate workers’ mispercep-
tion about working conditions and factories’ noncompliance with legal standards. Under
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these extensions, factory wages and the level of working conditions are lower than in the
benchmark case. This allows southern factories to undertake the manufacturing stage at
lower costs. As a consequence, more northern firms outsource production in the South,
and the firms that were already engaged in southern outsourcing are able to generate
even higher profits.
The benchmark model and the two extensions studied in this paper should be seen as
a first step in our understanding of the interrelationship between outsourcing and working
conditions. The model might be fruitfully extended to capture other dimensions of the
debate on brand companies and their global labor practices. Other important issues
that require further research include the presence of immigrant and underage workers at
contract factories and the impact of codes of conduct on working conditions.
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Online Appendix
Why do they JUST DO IT?
A theory of outsourcing and working conditions
Alejandro Donado24
This Online Appendix shows how to solve all maximization problems and how to
solve the model. It also provides some details that were left out of the paper due to
space constraints. The main sections correspond to the section with the same name in
the paper.
A Individuals
This section shows how to compute the demand functions in (3) and how to obtain the
indirect utility function in (5). For simplicity, the section drops the occupation and
country indices.
A.1 Demand functions
The computation of the demand functions in (3) requires two stages.25
24Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, Department of Economics, Adickesallee 32-34, 60322
Frankfurt am Main, Germany. (e-mail: a.donado@fs.de).
25Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999: 46-48) explain how to solve a similar two-stage maximization
problem.
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• First stage: Demand for y and X
In the first stage, individuals divide their total income w between consumption of the
homogeneous good y and of the manufacturing varieties aggregateX. That is, individuals
choose X and y to maximize their utility
u = z (s)Xαy1−α − umin (32)
subject to their budget constraint
PX + pyy = w,
where P is the price index associated with (32). The Lagrangian is
L = z (s)Xαy1−α − umin − λ (PX + pyy − w) .
The first-order conditions are
∂L
∂X
= z (s)αXα−1y1−α − λP = 0
(32)
⇐⇒ α
u+ umin
PX
= λ,
∂L
∂y
= z (s)Xα (1− α) y1−α−1 − λpy = 0
(32)
⇐⇒ (1− α)
u+ umin
pyy
= λ.
Equalizing the first-order conditions gives
α
u+ umin
PX
= (1− α)
u+ umin
pyy
⇐⇒ pyy =
(1− α)
α
PX. (33)
Plugging this in the budget constraint yields the demand for X
PX +
(1− α)
α
PX = w
⇐⇒ X = α
w
P
. (34)
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Inserting this in (33) yields the demand for y
pyy =
(1− α)
α
Pα
w
P
⇐⇒ y = (1− α)
w
py
. (35)
• Second stage: Demand for x (ω)
Equation (34) also makes clear that individuals wish to devote PX to manufacturing
goods. PX is a fraction α of their total income w. In the second stage, individuals
allocate their income for manufacturing goods PX to different manufacturing varieties.
Thus, individuals choose x (ω) to maximize
X =
(∫
∈Ω
x (ω)(σ−1)/σ dω
)σ/(σ−1)
(36)
subject to
∫
∈Ω
p (ω) x (ω) dω = PX. (37)
The Lagrangian is
L =
(∫
∈Ω
x (ω)(σ−1)/σ dω
)σ/(σ−1)
− λ
(∫
∈Ω
p (ω) x (ω) dω − PX
)
.
The first-order condition is
∂L
∂x (ω)
=
σ
(σ − 1)
(∫
∈Ω
x (ω)(σ−1)/σ dω
) σ
(σ−1)
−1
(σ − 1)
σ
x (ω)
(σ−1)
σ
−1
− λp (ω) = 0
(36)
⇐⇒ x (ω) =
X
(λp (ω))σ
. (38)
Plugging this in (37) yields
∫
∈Ω
p (ω)
X
(λp (ω))σ
dω = PX ⇐⇒ λσ =
∫
∈Ω
p (ω)1−σ dω
P
.
Inserting this in (38) gives
x (ω) =
p (ω)−σ
P 1−σ
PX, (39)
3
where
P =
(∫
∈Ω
p (ω)1−σ dω
)1/(1−σ)
.
Finally, plugging (34) in (39) gives the demand for each manufacturing variety
x (ω) =
p (ω)−σ
P 1−σ
αw.
A.2 Indirect utility function
To obtain the indirect utility function in (5), plug (34) and (35) in (32). This yields
u = z (s)
(
α
w
P
)α(
(1− α)
w
py
)1−α
− umin
= z (s)
w
Λ
Φ− umin,
where
Λ ≡ Pαp1−αy and Φ ≡ α
α (1− α)1−α .
B Manufacturing sector
This section shows how to solve the northern firms’ maximization problem in (9) - (11),
how to obtain the profit flows in (12) and (13), and derives other results that are necessary
for solving the model in section D.
B.1 Maximization problem
Consider first a firm outsourcing in the South. Since the southern factory’s participation
constraint in (11) is binding, the problem can be reformulated as
max
hS ,mS
πS = rS
(
hS,mS
)
− wNy h
S − τpSmm
S − wNy f
S, (40)
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where the revenue is defined as
rS
(
hS,mS
)
= pS
(
qS
(
hS,mS
))
qS
(
hS,mS
)
.
Before we solve this problem, first note that the aggregate demand for a final good whose
manufacturing stage was outsourced in the South is
qS =
(
pS
)−σ
P 1−σ
αE.
Plugging (see eq. (14))
B ≡
1
σ
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ−1
αE
P 1−σ
⇐⇒
αE
P 1−σ
=
σσB
(σ − 1)σ−1
and rearranging yields
qS =
(
pS
)−σ σσB
(σ − 1)σ−1
⇐⇒ pS = B1/σσ (σ − 1)−(σ−1)/σ
(
qS
)−1/σ
.
The revenue is then
rS = pSqS = B1/σσ (σ − 1)−(σ−1)/σ
(
qS
)−1/σ
qS
= B1/σσ (σ − 1)−(σ−1)/σ
(
qS
)(σ−1)/σ
.
Plugging qS (ϕ) = ϕ
(
hS
η
)η (
mS
1−η
)1−η
(see eq. (7)) yields
rS = B1/σσ (σ − 1)−(σ−1)/σ
(
ϕ
(
hS
η
)η (
mS
1− η
)1−η)(σ−1)/σ
= B1/σσ (σ − 1)−(σ−1)/σ ϕ(σ−1)/σ
(
hS
η
)η(σ−1)/σ (
mS
1− η
)(1−η)(σ−1)/σ
. (41)
Using this revenue, we can now solve the maximization problem in (40). The first-order
conditions are
B1/σσ (σ − 1)−(σ−1)/σ ϕ(σ−1)/σ
·
η (σ − 1)
σ
(
hS
) η(σ−1)
σ
−1
(
1
η
)η(σ−1)/σ (
mS
1− η
)(1−η)(σ−1)/σ
= wNy
5
(41)
⇐⇒
η (σ − 1)
σ
rS
hS
= wNy
⇐⇒ hS (ϕ) =
(σ − 1) η
σwNy
rS (ϕ) (42)
and
B1/σσ (σ − 1)−(σ−1)/σ ϕ(σ−1)/σ
·
(
hS
η
)η(σ−1)/σ
(1− η) (σ − 1)
σ
(
mS
) (1−η)(σ−1)
σ
−1
(
1
1− η
)(1−η)(σ−1)/σ
= τpSm
(41)
⇐⇒
(1− η) (σ − 1)
σ
rS
mS
= τpSm
⇐⇒ mS (ϕ) =
(σ − 1) (1− η)
στpSm
rS (ϕ) . (43)
The problem of a firm outsourcing in the North can be solved similarly. The first-order
conditions are then given by
hN (ϕ) =
(σ − 1) η
σwNy
rN (ϕ) and mN (ϕ) =
(σ − 1) (1− η)
σpNm
rN (ϕ) . (44)
B.2 Profit flows
This section shows how to compute the profit flow of the firm outsourcing in the South
in (13). The profit flow of the firm outsourcing in the North in (12) can be computed
similarly.
Plugging the first-order conditions (42) and (43) in the revenue function (41) gives
rS = B1/σσ (σ − 1)−(σ−1)/σ ϕ(σ−1)/σ


(σ−1)η
σwNy
rS
η


η(σ−1)/σ( (σ−1)(1−η)
στpSm
rS
1− η
)(1−η)(σ−1)/σ
⇐⇒ rS = B1/σσ1/σϕ(σ−1)/σ
((
wNy
)η (
τpSm
)(1−η))(1−σ)/σ (
rS
) (σ−1)
σ
⇐⇒
(
rS
) 1
σ = B1/σσ1/σϕ(σ−1)/σ
((
wNy
)η (
τpSm
)(1−η))(1−σ)/σ
⇐⇒ rS (ϕ) = σϕσ−1B
((
wNy
)η (
τpSm
)(1−η))1−σ
. (45)
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Now, plugging the first-order conditions (42) and (43) in the profit function yields
πS = rS − wNy
(σ − 1) η
σwNy
rS − τpSm
(σ − 1) (1− η)
στpSm
rS − wNy f
S
⇐⇒ πS =
rS (ϕ)
σ
− wNy f
S. (46)
Finally, inserting (45) gives
πS = ϕσ−1B
((
wNy
)η (
τpSm
)(1−η))1−σ
− wNy f
S.
B.3 Some useful results
This and the following section derive some results that are necessary for solving the model
in section D.
First note that, similarly to (45), the revenue of the firm outsourcing in the North is
given by
rN (ϕ) = σϕσ−1B
((
wNy
)η (
pNm
)1−η)1−σ
.
This together with (45) imply
ri (ϕ1)
ri (ϕ2)
=
(
ϕ1
ϕ2
)σ−1
(47)
and
rS (ϕ)
rN (ϕ)
=
(
pNm
τpSm
)(1−η)(σ−1)
. (48)
Similar relationships can be obtained for hi (ϕ) and mi (ϕ) using (42), (43), and (44).
In particular,
hi (ϕ1)
hi (ϕ2)
=
mi (ϕ1)
mi (ϕ2)
=
ri (ϕ1)
ri (ϕ2)
=
(
ϕ1
ϕ2
)σ−1
,
hS (ϕ1)
hN (ϕ2)
=
rS (ϕ)
rN (ϕ)
=
(
pNm
τpSm
)(1−η)(σ−1)
,
mS (ϕ)
mN (ϕ)
=
pNm
τpSm
rS (ϕ)
rN (ϕ)
=
pNm
τpSm
(
pNm
τpSm
)(1−η)(σ−1)
=
(
pNm
τpSm
)(1−η)(σ−1)−1
,
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hS (ϕ)
mS (ϕ)
=
η
1− η
τpSm
wNy
,
and
hN (ϕ)
mN (ϕ)
=
η
1− η
pNm
wNy
.
Also note that analogously to (46), the profit function of the firm outsourcing in the
North is
πN =
rN (ϕ)
σ
− wNy f
N .
Using this, we can also determine the revenue of the firm with productivity ϕN (that is,
of the firm with πN = 0) as
πN =
rN
(
ϕN
)
σ
− wNy f
N = 0
⇐⇒ rN
(
ϕN
)
= σwNy f
N .
This result is useful since together with (47), we have
rN (ϕ) =
(
ϕ
ϕN
)σ−1
rN
(
ϕN
)
⇐⇒ rN (ϕ) =
(
ϕ
ϕN
)σ−1
σwNy f
N . (49)
B.4 Cost functions and final-good prices
The cost function of a firm that outsources in the North is
cN
(
wNy , p
N
m, q
N
)
= wNy f
N +
qN
ϕ
(
wNy
)η (
pNm
)1−η
and of a firm that outsources in the South is
cS
(
wNy , p
S
m, q
S
)
= wNy f
S +
qS
ϕ
(
wNy
)η (
τpSm
)1−η
.
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In a monopolistic competition framework, final-good prices are equal to a constant mark-
up σ/ (σ − 1) over marginal costs:
pN (ϕ) =
σ
σ − 1
∂cN
(
wNy , p
N
m, q
N
)
∂qN
=
σ
σ − 1
(
wNy
)η (
pNm
)1−η
ϕ
(50)
and
pS (ϕ) =
σ
σ − 1
∂cS
(
wNy , p
S
m, q
S
)
∂qS
=
σ
σ − 1
(
wNy
)η (
τpSm
)1−η
ϕ
. (51)
C Contract factories
This section shows how to obtain the factory variables in (18), (19), and (20). The
factory’s problem is
max
wim,s
i
m
πim = p
i
m − w
i
m − γs
i
m
subject to the participation constraint
z
(
sim
) wim
Λ
Φ− umin =
wiy
Λ
Φ− umin
⇐⇒ z
(
sim
)
wim = w
i
y
(17)
⇐⇒
sim
1 + sim
wim = w
i
y
⇐⇒ wim = w
i
y
((
sim
)−1
+ 1
)
. (52)
Using this last equation, the problem can be simplified to
max
sim
πim = p
i
m − w
i
y
((
sim
)−1
+ 1
)
− γsim.
The first-order condition is
wiy
(
sim
)−2
− γ = 0
⇐⇒ sim =
(
wiy
γ
)1/2
. (53)
This is the factory level of working conditions. Now, inserting (53) in (52) and rearranging
yields the factory wages
wim =
(
wiyγ
)1/2
+ wiy. (54)
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The manufacturing production price can be obtained from
πim = 0 ⇐⇒ p
i
m = w
i
m + γs
i
m
(53),(54)
=
(
wiyγ
)1/2
+ wiy + γ
(
wiy
γ
)1/2
⇐⇒ pim = 2
(
wiyγ
)1/2
+ wiy.
D Equilibrium
This section shows how to solve the model under the assumption that the productivity
ϕ is Pareto distributed, a standard assumption in the literature (see, e.g., Antràs and
Yeaple 2014: 81). We begin by obtaining ϕN , ϕS, and B. With these three variables
at hand, we can then compute all other variables in the model, including the number of
manufacturing varieties and the manufacturing price index.
D.1 Finding ϕN , ϕS, and B
Equations (22), (23), and (24) jointly determine ϕN , ϕS, and B. To see this, first solve
(22) and (23) for B and equalize the resulting equations
((
wNy
)η (
pNm
)1−η
ϕN
)σ−1
wNy f
N =
(
wNy
)1−η(1−σ) (
fS − fN
)
(τpSm)
(1−η)(1−σ)
− (pNm)
(1−η)(1−σ)
1
(ϕS)σ−1
⇐⇒ ϕS =


(
wNy
)1−η(1−σ) (
fS − fN
)
(τpSm)
(1−η)(1−σ)
− (pNm)
(1−η)(1−σ)
1
wNy f
N
(
1(
wNy
)η
(pNm)
1−η
)σ−1

1
σ−1
ϕN
⇐⇒ ϕS =
(
fS/fN − 1
(pNm/τp
S
m)
(1−η)(σ−1)
− 1
) 1
σ−1
ϕN . (55)
Also note that the free entry condition in (24) can be expressed with (12) and (13) as
∫ ϕS
ϕN
(
ϕσ−1B
((
wNy
)η (
pNm
)1−η)1−σ
− wNy f
N
)
g (ϕ) dϕ
+
∫
∞
ϕS
(
ϕσ−1B
((
wNy
)η (
τpSm
)1−η)1−σ
− wNy f
S
)
g (ϕ) dϕ = wNy fe.
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Rearranging and plugging
∫ ϕS
ϕN
ϕσ−1g (ϕ) dϕ =
∫
∞
ϕN
ϕσ−1g (ϕ) dϕ−
∫
∞
ϕS
ϕσ−1g (ϕ) dϕ yields
B
((
wNy
)η (
pNm
)1−η)1−σ
(∫
∞
ϕN
ϕσ−1g (ϕ) dϕ−
∫
∞
ϕS
ϕσ−1g (ϕ) dϕ
)
− wNy f
N
(
G
(
ϕS
)
−G
(
ϕN
))
+B
((
wNy
)η (
τpSm
)1−η)1−σ
∫
∞
ϕS
ϕσ−1g (ϕ) dϕ− wNy f
S
(
1−G
(
ϕS
))
= wNy fe. (56)
The Pareto cumulative distribution function is given by
G (ϕ) = 1−
(
ϕ
ϕ
)κ
, (57)
where κ is the shape parameter of the distribution, and ϕ > 0 denotes the minimum
productivity level that a northern firm can draw. Under the assumption that κ > σ − 1,
it can be shown that26
∫
∞
ϕ̂
ϕσ−1g (ϕ) dϕ =
κϕκϕ̂σ−1−κ
κ− (σ − 1)
. (58)
We can express (56) using (57) and (58) as
B
((
wNy
)η (
pNm
)1−η)1−σ
(
κϕκ
(
ϕN
)σ−1−κ
κ− (σ − 1)
−
κϕκ
(
ϕS
)σ−1−κ
κ− (σ − 1)
)
− wNy f
N
(
1−
(
ϕ
ϕS
)κ
−
(
1−
(
ϕ
ϕN
)κ))
+B
((
wNy
)η (
τpSm
)1−η)1−σ κϕκ
(
ϕS
)σ−1−κ
κ− (σ − 1)
− wNy f
S
(
1−
(
1−
(
ϕ
ϕS
)κ))
= wNy fe
⇐⇒
B
((
wNy
)η (
pNm
)1−η)1−σ
κϕκ
κ− (σ − 1)
((
ϕN
)σ−1−κ
−
(
ϕS
)σ−1−κ)
+
B
((
wNy
)η (
τpSm
)1−η)1−σ
κϕκ
κ− (σ − 1)
(
ϕS
)σ−1−κ
− wNy f
Nϕκ
((
ϕN
)−κ
−
(
ϕS
)−κ)
− wNy f
Sϕκ
(
ϕS
)−κ
= wNy fe.
26The assumption that κ > σ− 1 is standard in the literature (see, e.g., Antràs and Yeaple 2014: 81).
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Plugging ϕN =
(
wNy f
N
B
) 1
σ−1 (
wNy
)η (
pNm
)1−η
⇐⇒ B =
(
(wNy )
η
(pNm)
1−η
ϕN
)σ−1
wNy f
N (see
(22)) and (55) gives
((
wNy
)η (
pNm
)1−η
ϕN
)σ−1
wNy f
N
((
wNy
)η (
pNm
)1−η)1−σ
κϕκ
κ− (σ − 1)
·

(ϕN
)σ−1−κ
−


(
fS/fN − 1
(pNm/τp
S
m)
(1−η)(σ−1)
− 1
) 1
σ−1
ϕN


σ−1−κ

+
((
wNy
)η (
pNm
)1−η
ϕN
)σ−1
wNy f
N
((
wNy
)η (
τpSm
)1−η)1−σ
κϕκ
κ− (σ − 1)
·


(
fS/fN − 1
(pNm/τp
S
m)
(1−η)(σ−1)
− 1
) 1
σ−1
ϕN


σ−1−κ
− wNy f
Nϕκ

(ϕN
)−κ
−


(
fS/fN − 1
(pNm/τp
S
m)
(1−η)(σ−1)
− 1
) 1
σ−1
ϕN


−κ

−wNy f
Sϕκ


(
fS/fN − 1
(pNm/τp
S
m)
(1−η)(σ−1)
− 1
) 1
σ−1
ϕN


−κ
= wNy fe
⇐⇒
wNy f
Nκϕκ
(
ϕN
)−κ
κ− (σ − 1)

1−
(
fS/fN − 1
(pNm/τp
S
m)
(1−η)(σ−1)
− 1
)σ−1−κ
σ−1


+
(
pNm
τpSm
)(1−η)(σ−1) wNy fNκϕκ
(
ϕN
)−κ
κ− (σ − 1)
(
fS/fN − 1
(pNm/τp
S
m)
(1−η)(σ−1)
− 1
)σ−1−κ
σ−1
− wNy f
Nϕκ
(
ϕN
)−κ

1−
(
fS/fN − 1
(pNm/τp
S
m)
(1−η)(σ−1)
− 1
) −κ
σ−1


−wNy f
Sϕκ
(
ϕN
)−κ
(
fS/fN − 1
(pNm/τp
S
m)
(1−η)(σ−1)
− 1
) −κ
σ−1
= wNy fe.
⇐⇒ ϕN =

 σ − 1
κ− (σ − 1)
fN
fe

1 +
((
pNm
τpSm
)(1−η)(σ−1)
− 1
) κ
σ−1 (
fS
fN
− 1
)σ−1−κ
σ−1




1
κ
ϕ
⇐⇒ ϕN =


σ − 1
κ− (σ − 1)
fN +
((
pNm
τpSm
)(1−η)(σ−1)
− 1
) κ
σ−1
(
(fN)
κ
(fS−fN )κ−(σ−1)
) 1
σ−1
fe


1
κ
ϕ.
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This is the solution for ϕN . Using this, we can obtain ϕS from (55) and B from B =
(
(wNy )
η
(pNm)
1−η
ϕN
)σ−1
wNy f
N (see eq. (22)).
D.2 Average productivities
As in Melitz (2003), this section computes average productivities that are useful for
expressing aggregate variables in the model. Begin by denoting by n the equilibrium
mass of manufacturing firms (and of varieties), by
nN = n
(
G
(
ϕS
)
−G
(
ϕN
)
1−G (ϕN)
)
the mass of firms outsourcing in the North, and by
nS = n
(
1−G
(
ϕS
)
1−G (ϕN)
)
(59)
the mass of firms outsourcing in the South, so that n = nN + nS.
Now, the average productivity of firms outsourcing in the North is
ϕ̄N =
(∫ ϕS
ϕN
ϕσ−1
g (ϕ)
G (ϕS)−G (ϕN)
dϕ
) 1
σ−1
, (60)
and the average productivity of firms outsourcing in the South is
ϕ̄S =
(∫
∞
ϕS
ϕσ−1
g (ϕ)
1−G (ϕS)
dϕ
) 1
σ−1
. (61)
Then, the combined average productivity is (since n = nN + nS ⇐⇒ nN = n− nS)
ϕ̄ =


(
n− nS
) (
ϕ̄N
)σ−1
+
(
pNm
τpSm
)(1−η)(σ−1)
nS
(
ϕ̄S
)σ−1
n


1
σ−1
. (62)
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For the Pareto distribution, ϕ̄N and ϕ̄S are given by
ϕ̄N =
(∫ ϕS
ϕN
ϕσ−1
g (ϕ)
G (ϕS)−G (ϕN)
dϕ
) 1
σ−1
=
(
1
G (ϕS)−G (ϕN)
∫ ϕS
ϕN
ϕσ−1g (ϕ) dϕ
) 1
σ−1
=
(
1
G (ϕS)−G (ϕN)
(∫
∞
ϕN
ϕσ−1g (ϕ) dϕ−
∫
∞
ϕS
ϕσ−1g (ϕ) dϕ
)) 1
σ−1
(57),(58)
=

 1
1−
(
ϕ
ϕS
)κ
−
(
1−
(
ϕ
ϕN
)κ)
(
κϕκ
(
ϕN
)σ−1−κ
κ− (σ − 1)
−
κϕκ
(
ϕS
)σ−1−κ
κ− (σ − 1)
)

1
σ−1
=
(
κ
κ− (σ − 1)
(
ϕS
)σ−1−κ
−
(
ϕN
)σ−1−κ
(ϕS)−κ − (ϕN)−κ
) 1
σ−1
(63)
and
ϕ̄S =
(
1
1−G (ϕS)
∫
∞
ϕS
ϕσ−1g (ϕ) dϕ
) 1
σ−1 (57),(58)
=

 1
1−
(
1−
(
ϕ
ϕS
)κ)
κϕκ
(
ϕS
)σ−1−κ
κ− (σ − 1)


1
σ−1
=
(
κ
κ− (σ − 1)
(
ϕS
)σ−1
) 1
σ−1
=
(
κ
κ− (σ − 1)
) 1
σ−1
ϕS. (64)
It is clear from (63) and (64) that the average productivities ϕ̄N and ϕ̄S are completely
determined by the cutoffs ϕN and ϕS computed in section D.1.
D.3 Number of manufacturing varieties
This section shows how to determine the number of manufacturing varieties n. For
this purpose, we can use the homogeneous goods equilibrium condition, which equalizes
aggregate supply Y = Y N + Y S = aNLNy + a
SLSy and aggregate demand Y = (1− α)
E
py
,
so that
aNLNy + a
SLSy = (1− α)
E
py
. (65)
Before proceeding, we still need to find LNy , L
S
y , and E. To pin down L
N
y and L
S
y , we
respectively use the labor equilibrium condition in the North and in the South. Once we
have obtained these two variables, we can compute E.
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• Finding LNy
Individuals in the North can work in one of five different types of occupations, either
providing headquarter services, manufacturing services (i.e., in factory jobs), fixed costs
services, entry costs services, or producing the homogeneous good. The total amount of
workers employed in each of these occupations is respectively denoted by LNh , L
N
m, L
N
f ,
LNe , and L
N
y . In equilibrium, labor supply equals labor demand,
LN = LNh + L
N
m + L
N
f + L
N
e + L
N
y
=
[
nNhN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+ nShS
(
ϕ̄S
)]
+ nNmN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+
[
nNfN + nSfS
]
+ nefe + L
N
y , (66)
where ne represents the mass of northern firms that pay the sunk entry costs, of which
only n =
(
1−G
(
ϕN
))
ne survive.
Before continuing, it is important to emphasize the usefulness of Melitz’ (2003) ap-
proach to represent aggregate variables using average productivities. For instance, hN
(
ϕ̄N
)
is the amount of headquarter services produced by firms with the average productivity
ϕ̄N . Thus, multiplying hN
(
ϕ̄N
)
by nN gives the aggregate headquarter services of firms
outsourcing (their manufacturing stage) in the North. Similarly, nShS
(
ϕ̄S
)
represents the
aggregate headquarter services of firms outsourcing in the South. Since the production of
all headquarter services takes place in the North, nNhN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+nShS
(
ϕ̄S
)
represents the
aggregate headquarter services when combining all manufacturing firms in the economy.
To produce nNhN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+ nShS
(
ϕ̄S
)
, firms demand the amount LNh of labor; and since
headquarter services are produced one-to-one with labor, then nNhN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+nShS
(
ϕ̄S
)
=
15
LNh .
27 The same idea also applies to manufacturing services. Consequently, nNmN
(
ϕ̄N
)
denotes the aggregate production of manufacturing services of firms outsourcing in the
North. Since manufacturing services are also produced one-to-one with labor, the amount
of labor in the North employed producing manufacturing services LNm equals aggregate
production nNmN
(
ϕ̄N
)
.
Now, to determine LNy , solve (66) for L
N
y and rewrite the right-hand side using n =
(
1−G
(
ϕN
))
ne ⇐⇒ ne = n/
(
1−G
(
ϕN
))
, n = nN + nS ⇐⇒ nN = n− nS, and (59)
to obtain
LNy = L
N − n


(
1−G(ϕS)
1−G(ϕN )
)(
hS
(
ϕ̄S
)
− hN
(
ϕ̄N
)
−mN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+ fS − fN
)
+hN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+mN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+ fN + fe
1−G(ϕN )

 . (67)
It is useful to understand why equation (67) completely determines LNy . First, L
N , f i, and
fe are exogenously given. Second, G (ϕ
i) can be computed using the Pareto cumulative
distribution function in (57) and the cutoffs from section D.1. Third, hS
(
ϕ̄S
)
, hN
(
ϕ̄N
)
,
and mN
(
ϕ̄N
)
can be pinned down using the first-order conditions in (42) to (44) and the
27Note that we can equalize LNh either to n
NhN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+ nShS
(
ϕ̄S
)
or to nhN (ϕ̄) since LNh =
nNhN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+ nShS
(
ϕ̄S
)
= nhN (ϕ̄). To see this, compute
LNh = n
NhN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+ nShS
(
ϕ̄S
) (42),(44)
=
(
n− nS
) (σ − 1) η
σwNy
rN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+ nS
(σ − 1) η
σwNy
rS
(
ϕ̄S
)
(47)
=
(
n− nS
) (σ − 1) η
σwNy
(
ϕ̄N
ϕ̄
)σ−1
rN (ϕ̄) + nS
(σ − 1) η
σwNy
(
ϕ̄S
ϕ̄
)σ−1
rS (ϕ̄)
(48)
=
(
n− nS
) (σ − 1) η
σwNy
(
ϕ̄N
ϕ̄
)σ−1
rN (ϕ̄) + nS
(σ − 1) η
σwNy
(
ϕ̄S
ϕ̄
)σ−1(
pNm
τpSm
)(1−η)(σ−1)
rN (ϕ̄)
=
(σ − 1) η
σwNy
rN (ϕ̄)
ϕ̄σ−1
(
(
n− nS
) (
ϕ̄N
)σ−1
+ nS
(
ϕ̄S
)σ−1
(
pNm
τpSm
)(1−η)(σ−1))
(62)
=
(σ − 1) η
σwNy
rN (ϕ̄)
ϕ̄σ−1
nϕ̄σ−1 = n
(σ − 1) η
σwNy
rN (ϕ̄)
(44)
= nhN (ϕ̄) .
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results from section B.3. For instance,
hN
(
ϕ̄N
) (44)
=
(σ − 1) η
σwNy
rN
(
ϕ̄N
) (49)
=
(σ − 1) η
σwNy
(
ϕ̄N
ϕN
)σ−1
σwNy f
N = (σ − 1) η
(
ϕ̄N
ϕN
)σ−1
fN ,
where ϕN comes from (63) and ϕ̄N was computed in section D.2. And fourth, n can be
determined in a fashion illustrated below (see eq. (70)).
• Finding LSy
In the South, individuals can only work producing manufacturing services or the
homogeneous good. The labor market equilibrium condition in the South is
LS = LSm + L
S
y = n
SmS
(
ϕ̄S
)
+ LSy
(59)
= n
(
1−G
(
ϕS
)
1−G (ϕN)
)
mS
(
ϕ̄S
)
+ LSy .
Solving this for LSy gives
LSy = L
S − n
(
1−G
(
ϕS
)
1−G (ϕN)
)
mS
(
ϕ̄S
)
. (68)
• Finding E
In the model, total expenditure is given by E = wNy L
N + δNLNm + w
S
yL
S + δSLSm. To
understand this, note that factory workers are paid wiy + δ, where δ is the compensating
wage differential.28 All other workers are paid wiy. Therefore, total expenditure is given
28For the particular functional form for the health function in (17), the compensating wage differential
is given by δi =
(
wiyγ
)1/2
(see eq. (19)).
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by
E = wNy L
N + δNLNm + w
S
yL
S + δSLSm
= wNy L
N + δNnNmN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+ wSyL
S + δSnSmS
(
ϕ̄S
)
= wNy L
N + δN
(
n− nS
)
mN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+ wSyL
S + δSnSmS
(
ϕ̄S
)
= wNy L
N + wSyL
S + nδNmN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+ nS
(
δSmS
(
ϕ̄S
)
− δNmN
(
ϕ̄N
))
(59)
= wNy L
N + wSyL
S + nδNmN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+ n
(
1−G
(
ϕS
)
1−G (ϕN)
)
(
δSmS
(
ϕ̄S
)
− δNmN
(
ϕ̄N
))
= wNy L
N + wSyL
S + n
(
δNmN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+
(
1−G
(
ϕS
)
1−G (ϕN)
)
(
δSmS
(
ϕ̄S
)
− δNmN
(
ϕ̄N
))
)
.
(69)
• Number of varieties
To obtain the number of varieties, insert (67), (68), and (69) in (65). Rearranging
gives
aN

L
N − n


(
1−G(ϕS)
1−G(ϕN )
)(
hS
(
ϕ̄S
)
− hN
(
ϕ̄N
)
−mN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+ fS − fN
)
+hN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+mN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+ fN + fe
1−G(ϕN )




+ aS
(
LS − n
(
1−G
(
ϕS
)
1−G (ϕN)
)
mS
(
ϕ̄S
)
)
=
(1− α)
py


wNy L
N + wSyL
S
+n
(
δNmN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+
(
1−G(ϕS)
1−G(ϕN )
)(
δSmS
(
ϕ̄S
)
− δNmN
(
ϕ̄N
)))


⇐⇒ aNpy

L
N − n


(
1−G(ϕS)
1−G(ϕN )
)(
hS
(
ϕ̄S
)
− hN
(
ϕ̄N
)
−mN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+ fS − fN
)
+hN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+mN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+ fN + fe
1−G(ϕN )




+ aSpy
(
LS − n
(
1−G
(
ϕS
)
1−G (ϕN)
)
mS
(
ϕ̄S
)
)
= (1− α)
(
wNy L
N + wSyL
S
)
+ n (1− α)
(
δNmN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+
(
1−G
(
ϕS
)
1−G (ϕN)
)
(
δSmS
(
ϕ̄S
)
− δNmN
(
ϕ̄N
))
)
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(6)
⇐⇒ wNy L
N − nwNy


(
1−G(ϕS)
1−G(ϕN )
)(
hS
(
ϕ̄S
)
− hN
(
ϕ̄N
)
−mN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+ fS − fN
)
+hN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+mN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+ fN + fe
1−G(ϕN )


+ wSyL
S − nwSy
(
1−G
(
ϕS
)
1−G (ϕN)
)
mS
(
ϕ̄S
)
= (1− α)
(
wNy L
N + wSyL
S
)
+ n (1− α)
(
δNmN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+
(
1−G
(
ϕS
)
1−G (ϕN)
)
(
δSmS
(
ϕ̄S
)
− δNmN
(
ϕ̄N
))
)
⇐⇒ n =
α
(
wNy L
N + wSyL
S
)
(1− α) δNmN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+ (1− α)
(
1−G(ϕS)
1−G(ϕN )
)(
δSmS
(
ϕ̄S
)
− δNmN
(
ϕ̄N
))
+wNy


(
1−G(ϕS)
1−G(ϕN )
)(
hS
(
ϕ̄S
)
− hN
(
ϕ̄N
)
−mN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+ fS − fN
)
+hN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+mN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+ fN + fe
1−G(ϕN )


+wSy
(
1−G(ϕS)
1−G(ϕN )
)
mS
(
ϕ̄S
)
⇐⇒ n =
α
(
wNy L
N + wSyL
S
)
1−G(ϕS)
1−G(ϕN )
((
(1− α) δS + wSy
)
mS
(
ϕ̄S
)
+ wNy
(
hS
(
ϕ̄S
)
+ fS
))
+
G(ϕS)−G(ϕN)
1−G(ϕN )
((
(1− α) δN + wNy
)
mN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+ wNy
(
hN
(
ϕ̄N
)
+ fN
))
+wNy
fe
1−G(ϕN )
.
(70)
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D.4 Price index
This section shows that the price index in (4) can be expressed as P = n
1
1−σ pN (ϕ̄). To
see this, compute
P 1−σ =
∫ ϕS
ϕN
(
pN (ϕ)
)1−σ (
n− nS
) g (ϕ)
G (ϕS)−G (ϕN)
dϕ
+
∫
∞
ϕS
(
pS (ϕ)
)1−σ
nS
g (ϕ)
1−G (ϕS)
dϕ
(50),(51)
=
∫ ϕS
ϕN
(
σ
σ − 1
(
wNy
)η (
pNm
)1−η
ϕ
)1−σ (
n− nS
) g (ϕ)
G (ϕS)−G (ϕN)
dϕ
+
∫
∞
ϕS
(
σ
σ − 1
(
wNy
)η (
τpSm
)1−η
ϕ
)1−σ
nS
g (ϕ)
1−G (ϕS)
dϕ
(60),(61)
=
(
σ
σ − 1
(
wNy
)η (
pNm
)1−η
)1−σ (
n− nS
) (
ϕ̄N
)σ−1
+
(
σ
σ − 1
(
wNy
)η (
τpSm
)1−η
)1−σ
nS
(
ϕ̄S
)σ−1
=
(
σ
σ − 1
(
wNy
)η (
pNm
)1−η
)1−σ((
n− nS
) (
ϕ̄N
)σ−1
+
(
pNm
τpSm
)(1−η)(σ−1)
nS
(
ϕ̄S
)σ−1
)
(62)
=
(
σ
σ − 1
(
wNy
)η (
pNm
)1−η
)1−σ
nϕ̄σ−1 = n
(
σ
σ − 1
(
wNy
)η (
pNm
)1−η
ϕ̄
)1−σ
(50)
= n
(
pN (ϕ̄)
)1−σ
⇐⇒ P = n
1
1−σ pN (ϕ̄) .
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